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ABSTRACT. Drawing upon problems of interpretation in political sociological research, this 
article questions the common practice of lumping  together moral traditionalism and 
authoritarianism. First, it is demonstrated that  of the two only moral traditionalism relates to 
religious orthodoxy. Second, the well-established strong correlation between both value 
orientations proves to be caused solely by the circumstance that non-traditionalism and non-
authoritarianism go hand in hand: moral traditionalism and authoritarianism are almost 
unrelated. Third, moral traditionalists are shown to vote for Christian right-wing parties, 
whereas authoritarianism more commonly leads to a vote for a secular right-wing party. 
Fourth, whereas moral traditionalism proves decisive for the voting behaviour of Christians, it 
is authoritarianism that underlies the non-Christian vote. These findings – consistent with 
theories on cultural modernisation – lead to the conclusion that attention should be paid to the 
distinction between these orientations because this aids the interpretation of research findings, 
and because authoritarianism will probably gain a more central role in politics at the cost of 
moral traditionalism. 
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Introduction 
 
In his classical work Political Man (1959), Lipset distinguished economic values from non-
economic, cultural values, arguing that political values have a bi-dimensional structure. This 
distinction has been validated time and again in empirical studies (see for instance Houtman, 
2003; Fleishman, 1988; Middendorp, 1991), leading to a general consensus that economic and 
cultural values differ fundamentally (cf. Evans & Heath, 1995; Evans, Heath & Lalljee, 1996; 
Heath, Evans & Martin, 1994). Although this is a valuable insight, insufficient attention has 
been paid to the nature of the cultural dimension: it seems customary in political-sociological 
research to lump together value orientations and opinions on divergent cultural issues without 
a clear theoretical justification. Mainly on the basis of empirical arguments, cultural issues are 
considered interchangeable: 
 
(…) research based on nationally representative data sets, collected among the 
Dutch population in 1975, 1980, 1985, and 1990, has demonstrated that the so-
called F-scale for authoritarianism is strongly related to more conventional 
measures of cultural conservatism. Examples are intolerance regarding 
homosexuals, a preference for the maintenance of traditional gender roles, family 
traditionalism, harsh attitudes toward criminals, and a willingness to limit political 
freedom of expression (Middendorp 1991: 111). Those findings indicate that there 
is ample reason to reject too neat a distinction between authoritarianism and 
culturally conservative political values. Indeed, their strong correlation suggests 
that it makes more sense to consider them highly interchangeable concepts. 
(Houtman, 2001: 163) 
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Achterberg (2004: 337-8) shows the same lack of attention for differences between 
cultural issues: he describes the contrast between cultural conservatism and cultural 
progressiveness as a conflict about ‘typical cultural issues such as “law and order”, “rights of 
suppressed minorities, homosexuals and women” [and] “traditional moral values.”’ Similarly, 
Flanagan and Lee (2003: 239-240)  designate items such as one’s view on freedom of speech, 
the clarity of good and evil, and sexual freedom all as ‘libertarian items’. This practice is also 
found in the work of Evans, Heath and Lalljee (1996: 99-100, 112; see also Heath, Evans and 
Martin, 1994: 130), who compose a cultural scale of, among other things, opinions regarding 
stiffer sentences, traditional moral values, and law obedience.  
The use of cultural issues in the present-day research practice (for more examples, see  
Achterberg & Houtman, 2006; Houtman, 2003) seems, in short, to be based on the notion that 
a morally traditional value orientation – a conservative stance on moral issues like gender-
relations, sexuality, life, and death – does not differ from an authoritarian stance – which 
implies aversion of cultural diversity and a rigid conception of social order.  
 However, this common practice proves to cause problems. For example, De Witte and 
Billiet (1999) experienced problems of interpretation: contrary to their expectations, a 
conservative cultural value orientation did not predict a vote for the Christian Democrats in 
Flanders. While discussing their research findings, they blame their operationalisation of 
cultural value orientations: 
 
(…) the indicators for cultural conservatism were rather ‘though’ [sic] ones, 
referring to ethnocentrism and authoritarianism mostly. ‘Softer’ indicators, such as 
moral attitudes and child rearing practices, were lacking. (…) we might have 
observed different results, if we had been able to use more moderate indicators of 
 3
cultural conservatism in our study. Future research should try to do so (1999: 
113,5). 
 
This recommendation suggests that moral traditionalism is somehow connected to a Christian 
worldview whereas authoritarianism is not. In this study we will assess to what extent there 
really is a difference between those cultural value orientations. 
 
Disentangling Moral Traditionalism and Authoritarianism 
 
In the west, Christians make up the traditional part of society when it comes to moral issues 
like gender relations, sexuality, life, and death. Their traditional stance is, of course, deeply 
inspired by the Christian bible and by and socialisation in Christian institutions. These grant 
legitimacy to a masculine order and the fostering of God-given life. Therefore, for Christians 
it is generally beyond doubt that this order should be respected and that life should be 
protected against man-induced changes. Christian religiosity seems, in other words, to be 
‘naturally’ tied to moral traditionalism. In the case of authoritarianism, on the other hand, 
such a ‘natural’ relationship with Christian doctrine appears to be lacking.   
To find out whether this is empirically observable, we will assess the relationship 
between the extent to which one endorses the central axioms of Christianity – religious 
orthodoxy – and moral traditionalism and authoritarianism respectively. If moral 
traditionalism is related to Christian religiosity and authoritarianism is not, religious 
orthodoxy will logically only be related with the former. 
 We use data from the series Cultural Changes in the Netherlands - a longitudinal 
survey project that started in the seventies and was executed by the Dutch Social and Cultural 
Planning Office. Since the Netherlands are highly secularised today, we use the 1975 file 
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(Middendorp, s.d.) wherein Christians and non-Christians are about equally represented, 
allowing for meaningful statistical comparison. The data set consists of 1977 respondents, 
which is 77 percent of the initially selected, and is representative for the Dutch population 
aged sixteen to seventy-four.  Political sociological research on cultural value orientations 
indicates findings derived from Dutch data on this matter are typical for the West in general 
(Houtman, 2003: 91).  
The items used to measure moral traditionalism are questions or propositions 
concerning gender-relations, homosexuality, the family, and reproduction, for example: ‘a 
woman is more capable of bringing up small children than a man is’, ‘homosexuals should be 
firmly dealt with’ and ‘if a woman so wishes, it should be possible for her to have an 
abortion’. Principal component analysis reveals a first factor with high loadings for all items, 
explaining 29 percent of the variance. The items form a good scale since Cronbach’s alfa is 
0.76.2
Authoritarianism is measured using seven Likert-items that belong to the F-scale 
available in the file. These are questions or propositions such as: ‘there are two sorts of 
people: the strong and the weak,’ ‘most of our social problems would be solved if we could 
somehow get rid of the immoral, crooked and feeble-minded people,’ and ‘what we need are 
fewer laws and institutions and more courageous, tireless, devoted leaders whom people can 
trust.’ Principal component analysis yields a first factor which explains 33 percent of the 
variance. The reliability of the scale is sufficient: Cronbach’s alfa is 0.66.3
Religious orthodoxy is constructed with eight items used for the same purpose by 
Middendorp (1991). It contains questions like: ‘do you believe in heaven?’, ‘do you believe in 
eternal life?’,  and ‘do you regard the bible as the word of God?’  Principal component 
analysis yields a first factor explaining 50 percent of the variance. With a Cronbach’s alfa of 
0.83, the scale is good. 
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 Table 1 represents the findings of the zero order-correlation analyses of moral 
traditionalism and authoritarianism with religious orthodoxy.   
 
[Table 1] 
 
Despite the large random sample there is no significant correlation between authoritarianism 
and religious orthodoxy whatsoever. The positive correlation between moral traditionalism 
and religious orthodoxy is, on the contrary, significant and rather strong. This clearly 
indicates that a Christian worldview is connected to moral traditionalism, but not to 
authoritarianism.   
Consequently, another question arises: how is it possible that two scales that are 
strongly correlated – a fact that causes many studies to lump them together in some sort of 
cultural conservatism scale – differ to such an extent in their correlation with a measure of 
religious orthodoxy?  Their different relationship with religious orthodoxy suggests that the 
well-established strong correlation between the two value orientations may be mainly caused 
by a convergence at the other end of the ideological spectrum – a convergence between non-
traditionalism and non-authoritarianism. This possibility is supported by the following 
considerations: 
An individual strongly attached to individual freedom may logically consider 
traditional moral values to be as oppressive as authoritarianism: both imply the oppression of 
individual self-realisation. S/he will therefore reject them and adhere to their antipoles: non-
traditional moral values and non-authoritarianism. Therefore, a considerably linear correlation 
is to be expected at these sides of the value orientations. However, moral traditionalism does 
not necessarily correlate equally strongly with authoritarianism. Although both imply the 
restriction of individual freedom, the findings mentioned above indicate these orientations 
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have different backgrounds. Whereas moral traditionalism is founded on legitimacy, because 
it is religiously inspired, authoritarian ideas have to do with coercion. Adhering to traditional 
ideas concerning gender-relations, homosexuality, the family, and life and death stemming 
from one’s Christian notion of the good life seems to differ from a strong attachment to a rigid 
and coercive social order. 
To assess these notions we split authoritarianism into an authoritarian and non-
authoritarian half and correlate both with moral traditionalism. The division of 
authoritarianism is based on the median, yielding equal sized groups allowing comparison.4 
These subpopulations with respectively low and high scores consist of 936 respondents each.  
The graphics of the correlations of both halves with moral traditionalism (figure 1 and 
2) are clear.  
 
[Figure 1] 
[Figure 2] 
 
 
The scatter plots and the lowest-lines – estimations of the regression functions – drawn in 
them, indicate a stronger positive linear correlation of moral traditionalism with 
authoritarianism in the group with low scores on authoritarianism than in the group with high 
scores.5 In order to make the correlations of both subpopulations comparable, we quantified 
their strengths. The relevant data are shown in table 2. 
 
[Table 2] 
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The positive correlation of moral traditionalism with the non-authoritarian half of 
authoritarianism is rather strong – almost as strong as with the entire authoritarianism scale. 
The correlation with the second, authoritarian, half is substantially weaker. The explained 
variance at the authoritarian half is almost nine times smaller than at the non-authoritarian 
half (p < 0.001).6 Part of the correlation may have disappeared only due to the splitting of 
authoritarianism, but the difference between the halves is so large this cannot be the only 
explanation. The correlation with moral traditionalism is thus to be attributed almost 
completely to the non-authoritarian side of authoritarianism. This means these two 
dimensions can be distinguished empirically – in spite of their high correlation. 
 
Political Implications of the Distinction between Moral Traditionalism and 
Authoritarianism 
 
 
Problems of interpretation arising in studies on voting behaviour if moral traditionalism and 
authoritarianism are not distinguished have led us to the assessments presented above. Now 
we know that these two value orientations can be distinguished empirically, the question 
remains: do they differ in their implications for voting behaviour?  
De Witte en Billiet (1999) expected moral traditionalism – their ‘soft’ indicators – 
would lead to a vote for the Christian Democrats. Our finding that a Christian worldview 
relates to a more traditional stand on moral issues seems to support this suggestion. Since, in 
general, conservatism leads to voting for a right-wing party, it is plausible that moral 
traditionalism leads to a vote for a Christian right-wing party. Authoritarians, on the other 
hand, are expected to vote for a secular right-wing party. If a highly legitimate guideline for 
the arrangement of society – such as Christian faith – is missing, force or coercion may be 
considered the only option to ‘maintain’ social order. Since secular right-wing parties are 
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most oppressive when it comes to cultural issues (Ignazi, 2003), these seem the ‘natural’ allies 
of authoritarians. 
We will assess these expectations by means of logistic regression analyses in which 
the dependent variable is a dichotomy of Christian right-wing parties versus secular right-
wing parties – the former categorised as 2 and the latter as 1.7 Moral traditionalism, 
authoritarianism, and Christian identity are included to find out how these variables relate to 
each other. Christian identity is measured as a standardised dichotomy based on self-
identification in which both religious groups – Protestants and Roman-Catholics – are 
categorised as Christians (51,9%), and all other categories as non-Christians (47,4%). In 
addition,  we include economic conservatism to control for economic beliefs.8
Economic conservatism is measured with a scale of nine Likert-items. It contains 
propositions and questions like: ‘the government should oblige employers to share in the 
profits to the same degree that shareholders do,’ ‘government tax on higher incomes should be 
[strongly increased….strongly decreased],’ and ‘the government should make many more 
grants available to children of less well-to-do-families.’  Principal component analysis reveals 
a first factor explaining 48 percent of the variance. Cronbach’s alfa being 0.86, the items form 
a reliable scale. 
Table 3 shows the results of the analyses. 
 
[Table 3] 
 
In a first model, only the control variables are included. Not surprisingly, a Christian identity 
leads to a vote for Christian right-wing parties. In a second model, moral traditionalism is 
added, reducing the effect of Christian identity. So, in concurrence with the findings 
presented above, the original effect of Christian identity is partly mediated by moral 
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traditionalism, which has the strongest effect.  In agreement with our expectations, moral 
traditionalism inspires a vote for Christian right-wing parties too. Whereas the inclusion of 
authoritarianism in a third model virtually does not alter the effect of Christian identity, it 
leads to an increase in the effect of moral traditionalism. As expected authoritarianism has a 
negative effect, indicating it underlies a vote for secular right-wing parties. These findings 
indicate that moral traditionalism and authoritarianism have different implications when it 
comes to voting.  
The fact that moral traditionalism appears to be derived from Christian religiosity, 
while authoritarianism does not appear to be, suggests these value orientations might also 
differ in salience between Christians and non-Christians. For Christians, moral traditionalism 
is likely to be highly salient, since it is based on their comprehensive system of belief, 
whereas – because of the lack of such an ideological basis – no significance for non-
Christians is to be expected. Authoritarianism, on the other hand, is probably only salient for 
non-Christians. For them, the proper arrangement of society can no longer be grounded on a 
clear encompassing grand narrative. Therefore, the maintenance of social order and the 
disapproval or approval of the cultural diversity that has arisen due to this lack of 
comprehensive guidelines is likely to be a major controversy. Since this conflict largely 
coincides with the distinction between authoritarianism and non-authoritarianism, these value 
orientations are expected to be of importance for non-Christians.  
This difference in importance is likely to be reflected in differences in voting 
behaviour, since the extent to which value orientations are salient finds expression in the 
extent to which people base their voting behaviour on these value orientations.  Because 
traditionalism and authoritarianism are related to the right wing of the political spectrum 
(Ignazi, 2003), moral traditionalism is probably  of more importance for right-wing voting 
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behaviour for  Christians than for non-Christians, while for authoritarianism the opposite is 
expected to be true. 
In a final analysis we assess this idea by splitting the file into Christians and non-
Christians and incorporating the assumed relations in path models. The dependent variable in 
these models is right-wing voting behaviour, measured by respondents’ party political 
preference. Therefore we use the question for which party the respondent would vote if there 
were to be elections for parliament at the moment of the survey. We placed the parties on a 
continuum by scaling the question for party political preference with the left-right self-
identification of the respondents – which is a five-point scale with a range from ‘very left’ to 
‘very right’.  
In order to control for other effects, we include variables in our models that have been 
demonstrated to be theoretically and empirically important for voting behaviour (compare 
Houtman, 2003; Middendorp, 1991), as far as this is possible with our dataset. Besides the 
three scales mentioned above, income and level of education are incorporated as explanatory 
variables, and gender as control variable.9 Income is measured as standardised gross family 
income. Level of education is measured at quasi-interval level by combining several questions 
into one standardised variable. Distinguishing seven levels, this variable measures the highest 
level of education completed. 
To assess our expectations we execute a conditional test with a multi-sample analysis 
(see Jöreskog & Sörbom, 1993: 51-84). We therefore construct identical path models for the 
Christian and non-Christian subpopulation. In this analysis economic conservatism, moral 
traditionalism, and authoritarianism are modelled as endogenous explanatory variables. 
Gender, level of education, and income are modelled as exogenous variables. Right-wing 
voting behaviour functions as an endogenous dependent variable. 
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Because several variables are of ordinal level of measurement and do not satisfy the 
condition of a multivariate normal distribution, both models are fitted to an asymptotic 
covariance matrix. By this, the standard errors are estimated with the ‘Weighted Least 
Squares’ (WLS) method (Jöreskog et al, 1999: 181). The parameters of these models are 
estimated with the ‘Maximum Likelihood’ (ML) method. In this we follow Jöreskog et al., 
who conclude this yields more likely results than the WLS method, which is commonly used 
for these kinds of models if smaller samples are fitted to an asymptotic covariance matrix 
(1991: 190). Because of the use of the ML method and multi-sample analysis, we test the fit 
of the models with the covariance matrix with the ‘Satorra-Bentler Scaled χ2’. This is 
necessary because the regular χ2 does not take into account the non-multivariate normal 
distribution of the variables in our models. Besides, the ‘Satorra-Bentler Scaled χ2’ is 
recommended for a multi-sample analysis (Jöreskog et al, 1999: 180). 
In a multi-sample analysis, two models are considered as nested. A first χ2-test verifies 
if both models with an identical parameterisation, and equal estimated values of the 
parameters fit the data. The second test is executed with several different estimated 
parameters per model. This means that the values of some parameters are considered to differ 
between the Christian and non-Christian subpopulation. In our case these are the parameters 
of the correlations between moral traditionalism and right-wing voting behaviour and 
between authoritarianism and right-wing voting behaviour. The conditional test shows that 
the second model fits the data significantly better than the first model.10 This means the effect 
of moral traditionalism and authoritarianism on right-wing voting behaviour differs between 
the Christian and non-Christian subpopulation. Figure 3 shows both models. All paths 
incorporated in both models are depicted. The parameters that differ by subpopulation are 
depicted as dotted lines.11 All relevant data are shown in table 4. 
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[Figure 3] 
[Table 4] 
 
The effect of moral traditionalism on right-wing voting behaviour is, as expected, stronger in 
the Christian subpopulation (0.34; p< 0.05) than in the non-Christian subpopulation (0.07; 
n.s.). A one-sided test shows this difference is significant (p < 0.001). The influence of 
authoritarianism on right-wing voting behaviour is smaller in the Christian subpopulation  
(-0.07; n.s.) than in the non-Christian subpopulation (0.20; p < 0.05). According to a one-
sided test, this difference is significant as well (p < 0.001). This indicates that for Christians 
moral traditionalism is indeed more salient than for non-Christians, while for authoritarianism 
it is the other way around.  
 
Secularisation and the Maladies of Modernity 
 
Our analyses indicate a bi-dimensional structure exists in cultural value orientations. Moral 
traditionalism can be distinguished empirically from authoritarianism, and these value 
orientations differ in their implications for voting behaviour. These findings seem in line with 
theories on cultural modernisation.  
Although many different concepts are used to describe the process of cultural 
transformation that took place in the west during the last decades – ranging from 
‘postmodernisation’ (Bauman, 1995) and ‘reflexive modernisation’ (Beck, Giddens & Lash, 
1994; Giddens, 1991) to ‘detraditionalisation’ (Heelas, Lash & Morris, 1996) – these concepts 
basically denote the same phenomenon: a transition from a society in which value orientations 
and identities that are considered highly legitimate are ‘pre-given’ by grand narratives, to a 
late modern society in which value orientations and identities lose their traditional legitimacy 
and meaning. As Christian religiosity traditionally has been the most comprehensive grand 
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narrative, this process of cultural modernisation is perceptible most clearly as the process of 
secularisation. 
 Traditionally the way one should think, feel, and act was self-evidently diverted from 
one’s Christian faith. Due to the process of secularisation, the proportion of people who do 
not derive their identity, meaning, and the accessory value orientations from a comprehensive 
ideology – the non-Christians – has increased. The way they handle cultural differences is 
based on reflection on society and ‘the self’. 
Those who lack Christian guidelines for thinking, feeling, and acting, experience many 
contradictory values without hierarchy or arrangement. For them, the existing social 
institutions have lost their once taken for granted legitimacy (see Berger et al., 1974, who 
refer to this as the ‘homeless mind’) . This in turn forms the breeding ground upon which 
anomie and alienation, the two ‘maladies of modernity’ (Zijderveld, 2000: 198-201), develop.  
A  common feature shared by these two conditions is that social institutions are no 
longer experienced as self-evident and legitimate, but otherwise they differ considerably. 
Whereas, in the sociology of culture’s sense, anomie stands for discontent with the absence of 
a meaningful social order, alienation stands for the desire to free oneself from an overbearing 
meaningless institutional order, which is considered a hindrance (Zijderveld, 2000). Feelings 
of anomie therefore go hand in hand with an authoritarian stand, as has been demonstrated 
time and again (see e.g. Lutterman & Middleton, 1970; McDill, 1961; Middendorp, 1991; 
Srole, 1956), while the anti-authoritarian counterculture from the sixties and seventies, as well 
as the new social movements which sprang from it, are inspired by feelings of alienation 
(Houtman, 2004; Roszak, 1968; Zijderveld, 1970). 
 Our research findings can be interpreted in the light of this theoretical framework. 
First, the finding that religious orthodoxy relates to moral traditionalism, whereas it does not 
relate to authoritarianism seems logical. Only moral traditionalism appears to be derived from 
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the ‘pre-given’ grand narrative of Christianity, of which religious orthodoxy is a clear 
expression.  
Second, precisely because it is derived from this encompassing ideology, moral 
traditionalism is based on legitimacy. Authoritarianism, on the other and, stems from the lack 
of certainty, reassurance, and a framework for interpretation that has risen due to the process 
of secularisation. Because of this difference in their backgrounds, it can be understood that 
these value orientations hardly correlate at their traditional and authoritarian sides – our 
second finding.  
 Third, focusing on the right side of the political spectrum where the differences come 
to light, we have demonstrated moral traditionalism leads to a vote for a Christian right-wing 
party, whereas authoritarianism underlies the vote for a secular right-wing party. Since the 
Christian notion of the good on which moral traditionalism is based guides Christian politics, 
the former relationship can be interpreted. The latter relationship seems to be related to the 
connection between anomie and authoritarianism. Those lacking clear-cut guidelines and 
longing for social order – the anomic – are authoritarian. They turn to secular right-wing 
parties, because such parties propose measures of coercion and law and order to deal with 
cultural diversity and problems of social order most strongly. 
 Fourth, moral traditionalism is important for Christians and not for non-Christians, 
most likely because only for the former is this value orientation religiously ‘pre-given’. 
Authoritarianism, on the contrary, is merely salient for non-Christians. Apparently since they 
are susceptible to the maladies of modernity, the conflict between the rigidity of social order 
and approval of cultural diversity that is related to authoritarianism appears to be important 
for them. 
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Discussion 
 
The suggestion underlying our study – that moral traditionalism is somehow connected to a 
Christian worldview while authoritarianism is not – has proven to be sound. Since our 
research findings show this clearly, one wonders why this insight has not been given its due in 
political sociology thus far. This might be attributable to the adherence to progressive values 
by most social scientists (cf. Ladd & Lipset, 1975). As mentioned, in their vision there is no 
principal distinction between moral traditionalism and authoritarianism: both are considered 
curtailing. Therefore, the correlation between the values they adhere to themselves might be 
considered self-evident. Consequently, they do not recognise that something different occurs 
at the other end of the spectrum. 
If the distinction between moral traditionalism and authoritarianism is  taken into 
account in empirical assessments, this will probably lead to less ‘unexpected’ research 
findings such as those of De Witte & Billiet (1999).  Conclusions such as ‘religion has by far 
the strongest effect on the libertarian-authoritarian vote’ (Middendorp, 1989: 289) will 
probably be a thing of the past:  the libertarian-authoritarian vote in this study was, by now 
unsurprisingly, based on a scale partly consisting of moral traditional items. 
Our analysis also has implications for research on authoritarianism and religious 
orthodoxy or fundamentalism – the latter concepts are often confused conceptually (Laythe et 
al., 2002: 624-5) – demonstrating positive correlations (see e.g. Hunsberger et al., 1996; 
Laythe et al., 2001; Laythe et al., 2002; Rhodes, 1960). The discrepancy with our results can 
partially be explained by the fact that fundamentalism is, contrary to our conceptualisation of 
orthodoxy, not so much about the content of religious beliefs as it is  about the ‘way in which 
beliefs are held’ (Hunsberger et al., 1996: 202, cf. Laythe et al., 2002): since fundamentalism 
is characterised by militant attempts to defend and spread the faith (Laythe et al., 2001), it is 
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logically tied to authoritarianism. More important from our theoretical point of view is that 
measures of authoritarianism employed incorporate moral traditionalism – for instance, items 
about ‘traditional beliefs’ (Laythe et al., 2001:  3, cf. Laythe et al., 2002). Therefore the 
positive correlations may be a by-product of the faulty practice of operationalisation that we 
address.12
Furthermore, studies aiming to show the rising salience of cultural voting behaviour 
(Achterberg, 2006; Achterberg & Houtman, 2006; Houtman, 2001), would probably have 
made their point more clearly if these had taken the distinction between moral traditionalism 
and authoritarianism into account. Their common practice of lumping authoritarianism and 
moral traditionalism together probably underestimates the rise of voting on the basis of 
cultural value orientations: due to the growing proportion of non-Christians the importance of 
moral traditionalism has probably declined. 
The growing number of people who lack clear ‘pre-given’ guidelines from Christianity 
might be the driving force of the increasing popularity of new left-wing politics and new 
right-wing politics since the sixties. After all, the non-authoritarian and authoritarian stances 
towards cultural issues converge strongly with the new left and new right political agenda 
respectively. From this perspective, it is striking that  authoritarianism in the study of De 
Witte and Billiet did not predict a vote for the Christian Democrats, but had by far the 
strongest negative and positive effect on a new left-wing party and new right-wing party 
respectively. All in all, the available evidence suggests authoritarianism is becoming the main 
cultural fault line in western societies. 
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Notes
                                                 
1 Both authors contributed equally to this article, which is a revised version of their bachelor’s thesis in 
Sociology. 
2 See appendix for details – the translations from Dutch are adopted from Middendorp (1991). All items are 
standardised. Only respondents with less than three ‘missing values’ on these items are assigned a score on this 
scale. All this applies to all other scales as well. 
3 The scales for moral conservatism and authoritarianism can be constructed separately in a meaningful way, 
because confirmatory factor analysis indicates that a model in which their respective items are explained by two 
latent factors fits the data better than a model in which only one latent factor is specified. Details are available 
from the authors upon request. 
4 Other criteria which can be used to split authoritarianism yield approximately the same results, since 
authoritarianism has a normal distribution. 
5 Since a lowess-line is never exactly linear – even when the regression function itself is linear – the almost 
straight line in the figure forms strong evidence for the existence of a linear correlation. 
6 Of course, a similar analysis can be conducted by splitting moral traditionalism instead of authoritarianism. 
This yields comparable results: the correlation between the non-traditional half and authoritarianism is 0.312 (p 
< 0.01), and 0.196 (p < 0.01) between the traditional half and authoritarianism. The explained variance at the 
traditional half is more than 2.5 times lower then at the non-traditional half (p < 0.01). 
7 Christian Democrats (CDA) and orthodox Christian parties (ARP, CHU, GPV, KVP, SGP, and RKPN) are 
coded as right-wing Christian parties (2), and the conservatives (VVD) as a secular right-wing party (1). 
8 Christian right-wing parties generally propagate more economic redistribution by the state than secular right-
wing parties. By controlling for economic conservatism the ‘pure’ cultural effects we aim to demonstrate remain. 
9 Men are coded as 1, woman are coded as 2. 
10 The χ2 of the model with unidentical values for some parameters needs to be extracted from the χ2 of the 
model with identical values for all parameters. In this case: 64.322 – 51.150 = 13.172 Taking the degrees of 
freedom of both models into account, it is possible to verify the significance of this difference. With a difference 
of two degrees of freedom, the difference in χ2 should at least be 5.991 to be significant at the five percent level. 
This condition is satisfied. 
11 In the model the error covariances between the endogenous explanatory variables economic conservatism, 
authoritarianism, and moral conservatism are set free. For clarity’s sake this is not depicted in this figure. 
12 These explanations do not appear to hold for Hunsberger et al. (1996), since all their separate items of 
authoritarianism correlate with fundamentalism as well as orthodoxy. However, these results are likely to be 
spurious. The data are based on a specific group (psychology students) that probably is predominantly 
progressive, so a high correlation between their scores on moral traditionalism and authoritarianism is to be 
expected (see our second table). Therefore, the reported zero-order correlations between authoritarianism on the 
one hand and fundamentalism and orthodoxy on the other hand may be caused by the fact that all these variables 
correlate with moral traditionalism. 
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Tables for Cultural Value Orientations and Christian Religiosity 
 
[8 tables] 
 
 
Table 1: Zero order-correlations of moral traditionalism and authoritarianism with religious orthodoxy 
Scale Religious orthodoxy N p  
Authoritarianism -0.03 963 0.420  
Moral traditionalism  0.31 952 < 0.001  
 
 
Table 2: Zero order-correlations between moral traditionalism and different parts of authoritarianism 
Scale Moral traditionalism N R2   
Authoritarianism 0.42*** 1792 0.175   
Authoritarianism, low scores 0.40*** 910 0.157   
Authoritarianism, high scores 0.14*** 881 0.018   
*** p < 0.001      
 
 
Table 3:  Logistic regression analyses of voting for a Christian right-wing party (2) versus voting for a secular 
right-wing party (1). N = 765 
 B (S.E.) B (S.E.) B (S.E.)  
Constant 0.312** (0.111) 0.331** (0.113) 0.357**  (0.114) 
Economic conservatism -0.809*** (0.148) -0.926*** (0.155) -0.982 *** (0.159)  
Christian identity (no = ref) 1.339*** (0.103) 1.182*** (0.106) 1.198*** (0.108)  
Moral traditionalism   1.213*** (0.211) 1.348*** (0.223)  
Authoritarianism     -0.419* (0.192)  
R2 (Nagelkerke) 0.413  0.457  0.463  
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
 
Table 4: The influence of the cultural value orientations on right-wing voting behaviour 
 Coefficient Standard error 
Christians (N = 619)    
Moral traditionalism 0.336* 0.114 
Authoritarianism -0.072 0.051 
R2 voting behaviour 0.255    
Non-Christians (N = 509)    
Moral traditionalism 0.072 0.0485 
Authoritarianism 0.196* 0.0505 
R2 voting behaviour 0.198   
* p  < 0.05 
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Table 5: Factor loadings of the moral traditionalism items  
Item Factor 1 
Homosexuals should be firmly dealt with 0.76 
Do you think that homosexuals should be left as free as possible to live their own life or do you 
feel that this should be opposed as much as possible? [Leave as free as possible…oppose as 
much as possible] 
0.70 
Homosexuals should be eradicated from society 0.68 
In a firm it is unnatural when women hold a position of authority over men 0.62 
It is not as important for a girl to get a good schooling as it is for a boy 0.53 
A married couple decides on principle not to have children although there are no medical 
objections. Can you approve of such a point of view or do you think it unacceptable? 
0.53 
A woman is more capable of bringing up small children than a man is  0.49 
After all boys can be educated more freely than girls  0.49 
To check the population expansion. birth-control should be strongly advocated   0.38 
Are there circumstances in which abortion should be allowed?   0.34 
If a woman so wishes. it should be possible for her to have an abortion 0.34 
Suppose a physician is able to put someone out of his/her misery at his/her own request by 
giving him/her an injection. What do you think he should do? [Give the injection…don’t give 
the injection]* 
0.34 
Eigenvalues 3.45 
R2 0.29 
Cronbach’s α 0.76 
 
* Authors’ translation from Dutch codebook of datafile. 
 
Table 6: Factor loadings of the authoritarianism (F-scale) items  
Item Factor 1 
Most people fall short of your expectations when you get to know them better 0.65 
Most of our social problems would be solved if we could somehow get rid or the immoral 
crooked and feeble-minded people 
0.61 
There are two sorts of people: the strong and the weak 0.59 
Young people often revolt against social institutions that they find unjust; however when they 
get older. they ought to become resigned to reality 
0.57 
What we need are fewer laws and institutions and more courageous tireless devoted leaders 
whom people can trust 
0.56 
Ill-mannered people cannot expect decent people to want to mix with them 0.55 
Nowadays more and more people are prying into matters that should remain personal and 
private 
0.50 
Eigenvalue 2.33 
R2 0.33 
Cronbach’s α 0.66 
 
 
Table 7: Factor loadings of the religious orthodoxy items 
Item Factor 1 
Do you believe in heaven? 0.82 
In the devil? 0.81 
In hell? 0.79 
Do you believe in eternal life? 0.72 
Did Adam and Eve exist? 0.69 
Do you regard the bible as the word of God? 0.65 
Do you think that praying has some meaning? 0.61 
Do you believe in purgatory? 0.49 
Eigenvalue 3.96 
R2 0.50 
Cronbach’s α 0.83 
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Table 8: Factor loadings of the economic conservatism items  
Item Factor 1 
Are you in favour or against the government taking radical measures to reduce the differences 
in ownership of property? 
0.79 
Are you in favour or against the government taking radical measures to reduce the differences 
in income levels? 
0.78 
The government should oblige employers to share in the profits to the same degree that 
shareholders do 
0.73 
Government tax on higher incomes should be [strongly increased….strongly decreased] 0.71 
The government should allow for the minimum income to rise more sharply than other income-
levels 
0.70 
Do you want the differences between higher and lower incomes to increase. decrease or remain 
as it is? 
0.68 
There are individuals who own a lot and others who own very little. Do you want these 
differences in the ownership of property to become larger. to become smaller or to remain as it 
is? 
0.64 
Surtax should be [strongly increased….strongly decreased] 0.61 
The government should make many more grants available to children of less well-to-do-
families 
0.60 
Eigenvalue 4.31 
R2 0.48 
Cronbach’s α 0.86 
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Figures for Cultural Value Orientations and Christian Religiosity 
 
[3 figures] 
 
Figure 1 Correlation between moral traditionalism and the first half of authoritarianism, N = 
910 
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Figure 2 Correlation between moral traditionalism and the second half of authoritarianism, N 
= 881 
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Figure 3 Path model for both categories, N = 619 / 509* 
 
 
 
* In the Christian and the non-Christian category respectively. 
a Men are coded as 1, woman are coded as 2. 
All coefficients depicted are significant at five percent level, unless indicated otherwise (n.s.) 
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